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Abstract
We analyze a market impact game between n risk averse agents who compete for liquidity in a market impact
model with permanent price impact and additional slippage. Most market parameters, including volatility and
drift, are allowed to vary stochastically. Our first main result characterizes the Nash equilibrium in terms of a
fully coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). Our second main result
provides conditions under which this system of FBSDEs has indeed a unique solution, which in turn yields the
unique Nash equilibrium. We furthermore obtain closed-form solutions in special situations and analyze them
numerically.
1 Introduction
Market impact games analyze situations in which several agents compete for liquidity in a market impact model or
try to exploit the price impact generated by competitors. In this paper, we follow Carlin et al. [6], Scho¨neborn and
Schied [23], Carmona and Yang [7], Schied and Zhang [19], Casgrain and Jaimungal [8], and others by analyzing
a market impact game in the context of the Almgren–Chriss market impact model. In [6, 23], all agents are risk-
neutral and market parameters are constant, which leads to deterministic Nash equilibria. Deterministic open-loop
equilibrium strategies are also obtained in [19], where agents maximize mean variance functionals or CARA utility.
In [7] closed-loop equilibria are studied numerically in a similar setup, and it is found by means of simulations
that then equilibrium strategies may no longer be deterministic. The approach in [8] is the closest to ours. There,
the authors analyze the infinite-agent, mean-field limit of a market impact game for heterogeneous, risk-averse
agents in a model with constant coefficients and partial information, and they characterize the mean-field game
through a forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE). In addition, there are several papers that
study market impact games in other price impact models, including models with linear transient price impact; see,
e.g., [14, 20, 18, 13].
Our contribution to this literature is twofold. First, on the mathematical side, we completely solve the problem
of determining an open-loop Nash equilibrium with stochastic model parameters and risk aversion for arbitrary
numbers of agents. Our solution relies on a characterization of the equilibrium strategies in terms of a fully coupled
systems of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). This characterization is given in Theorem
4.1. In the subsequent Theorem 4.2, we give sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a unique solution.
The main restriction is a lower bound on the volatility. Then we analyze the case of constant coefficients and the
case in which all agents share the same parameters but have different initial inventories. Numerical simulations are
provided for the case of constant coefficients which work for many agents.
Our second contribution consists in a modification of the traditional setup of the interaction term in a market
impact game with Almgren–Chriss-style price impact. The Almgren–Chriss model has two price impact components,
one permanent and one temporary. It is clear that permanent price impact must affect the execution prices of all
agents equally, and in [6, 23, 7, 19, 8] the same is assumed of the transient price impact. This assumption can
sometimes lead to counterintuitive results. For instance, if the temporary price impact is large in comparison with
the permanent price impact, then, in the presence of a large seller, it can be beneficial to build up a long position in
the stock, because a cessation of the trading activities of the large seller will lead to an immediate upwards jump of
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the expected price [23]. In the price impact literature, it is however not consensus that “temporary price impact”
is of the same nature as permanent price impact. For instance, Almgren et al. [3] write about temporary impact:
This expression is a continuous-time approximation to a discrete process. A more accurate description
would be to imagine that time is broken into intervals such as, say, one hour or one half-hour. Within
each interval, the average price we realise on our trades during that interval will be slightly less favorable
than the average price that an unbiased observer would measure during that time interval. The unbiased
price is affected on previous trades that we have executed before this interval (as well as volatility), but
not on their timing. The additional concession during this time interval is strongly dependent on the
number of shares that we execute in this interval.
Likewise, Gatheral [10, p. 751] writes:
The second component of the cost of trading corresponds to market frictions such as effective bid-ask
spread that affect only our execution price: We refer to this component of trading cost as slippage
(temporary impact in the terminology of Huberman and Stanzl).
Based on these interpretations of “temporary price impact” as slippage, it appears to be more natural that only
the trades of the executing agent and not the trades of the other market participants are affected by the resulting
cost. In our paper, we therefore keep a term for “temporary price impact”, but it only affects the execution costs
of the corresponding agent and not of the other agents.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up our model on portfolio liquidation in the Almgren-
Chriss framework. Single agent optimization is studied in Section 3, where the corresponding existence, uniqueness
and characterization results for the optimal liquidation strategy are stated. Section 4 is dedicated to present the
characterization result for Nash equilibrium and investigates the solvability of the characterizing FBSDE. Some
explicit solutions for Nash equilibria are analyzed in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries and problem formulation
2.1 Frequently used notation
Let W = (Wt)t≥0 be a d-dimensional Brownian motion on a probability space (Ω,F , P ) and denote by (Ft)t≥0 the
complete filtration generated by W . Throughout, we fix a finite time horizon T > 0. We endow Ω × [0, T ] with
the predictable σ-algebra P and Rn with its Borel σ-algebra B(Rn). Equalities and inequalities between random
variables and processes are understood in the P -a.s. and P ⊗ dt-a.e. sense, respectively. The Euclidean norm is
denoted by | · |. For m ∈ [1,∞] and k ∈ N, we denote by ‖ · ‖m denotes the Lm-norm, by Sm(Rk) the set of
k-dimensional continuous adapted processes Y on [0, T ] such that
‖Y ‖Sm(Rk) :=
∥∥∥∥ sup
0≤t≤T
|Yt|m
∥∥∥∥
m
<∞,
and by Hm(Rk) the set of predictable Rk-valued processes Z such that
‖Z‖Hm(Rk) =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
(∫ T
0
|Zs|2ds
) 1
2
∥∥∥∥∥∥
m
<∞.
The space BMO(Rk) consists of all predictable Rk-valued processes Z such that
‖Z‖BMO(Rk) = sup
τ∈T
∥∥∥∥∥E
(∫ T
τ
|Zs|2ds
) 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣Fτ
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
<∞
where T is the set of all stopping times with values in [0, T ].
2.2 Model setup
We consider n financial agents who are active in a financial market of Almgren–Chriss-type and whose trading
strategies interact via permanent price impact. More precisely, we adapt the continuous-time setting of [1], where
2
each agent i has initial inventory Qi0 at time t = 0 and subsequently uses a trading strategy whose trading rate is
given by a process qi ∈ H2(R). That is, at time t ∈ [0, T ], the inventory of agent i is given by
Qq
i
t = Q
i
0 +
∫ t
0
qisds.
This trading strategy impacts the price of the risky asset by means of permanent price impact. It is usually assumed
that this permanent price impact is linear in the traded inventory (see, e.g., the discussion in Section 3 of [11]).
Thus, we assume that the price at which shares of the risky assets can be traded at time t is given by
Sqt = S0 +
∫ t
0
µs ds+ a
n∑
i=1
∫ t
0
qis ds+
∫ t
0
σs dWs, (2.1)
where µ ∈ S∞(R) is a generic drift, σ ∈ S∞(Rd) is a volatility process, and, for a fixed price impact parameter
a > 0, the term a
∑n
i=1
∫ t
0
qis ds describes the cumulative price impact generated by the strategies of all agents.
At time t, the ith agent sells −qit dt shares at price Sqt . The implementation shortfall, i.e., the difference between
book value and liquidation proceeds, is therefore given by Qi0S0 − Qq
i
T S
q
T +
∫ T
0
qitS
q
t dt. In addition, the trading
strategy qi generates “slippage”, including transaction costs, instantaneous price impact effects etc., modeled by
the cost functional b
∫ T
0
(qit)
2 dt; see, e.g., [1] and the discussion in the introduction. Moreover, any inventory held
at time t > 0 gives rise to financial risk. We assume that this risk is measured by the expectation of the term
αi
(
Qq
i
T
)2
+
∫ T
0
λiσ
2
t
(
Qq
i
t
)2
dt (2.2)
where αi and λi are nonnegative constants. The first term in (2.2) is clearly a penalty term penalizing any inventory
that is still present at time T . As shown by Scho¨neborn [22, 21], the expectation of the integral term in (2.2) can
be regarded as a continuously re-optimized variance functional with infinitesimal time horizon; see also [2, 9, 24]
for related motivations of this risk term. It follows that the objective of agent i is to minimize the expectation of
following cost functional over strategies qi ∈ H2(R),
CiT (Q
i
0, q
i, q−i) = Qi0S
q
0 +
∫ T
0
qit
(
Sqt + bq
i
t
)
dt−QqiT SqT + αi
(
Qq
i
T
)2
+
∫ T
0
λiσ
2
t
(
Qq
i
t
)2
dt; (2.3)
here, q−i := (q1, . . . , qi−1, qi+1, . . . , qn) denotes the collection of the strategies of all other agents.
Our goal in this paper is to discuss the existence, uniqueness and structure of Nash equilibria for the cost
criterion described above. As usual, a collection q∗ = (q1∗, . . . , qn∗) ∈ H2(Rn) of strategies will be called a Nash
equilibrium if, for i = 1, . . . , n,
min
qi∈H2(R)
E
[
CiT (Q
i
0, q
i, q−i∗)
]
= E
[
CiT (Q
i
0, q
i∗, q−i∗)
]
.
3 Single-agent optimization
In preparation for the discussion of Nash equilibria defined at the end of Section 2.2, we analyze first the optimization
problem for a fixed agent i when the strategies of all other agents are fixed. A variety of methods has been used to
solve similar and related problems; see, e.g., [2, 9, 24, 17, 12, 4]. Here, our goal is to represent solutions in terms of
a BSDE in Theorem 3.1.
First, plugging formula (2.1) for Sq into our expression (2.3) of the cost-risk functional CiT (Q
i
0, q
i, q−i) and
integrating by parts, we obtain the alternative expression
CiT (Q
i
0, q
i, q−i) =
a
2
(
Qi0
)2 − ∫ T
0
Qq
i
t
µt + a∑
j 6=i
qjt
 dt− ∫ T
0
Qq
i
t σtdWt
+
∫ T
0
b
(
qit
)2
dt+
(
αi − a
2
)(
Qq
i
T
)2
+
∫ T
0
λiσ
2
t
(
Qq
i
t
)2
dt.
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Since, by assumption, σ ∈ S∞(Rd) and qi ∈ H2(R), the stochastic integral ∫ T
0
Qq
i
t σtdWt is a true martingale, and
so taking expectations yields
E
[
CiT (Q
i
0, q
i, q−i)
]
=
a
2
(
Qi0
)2 − E
∫ T
0
Qq
i
t
µt + a n∑
j=1
qjt
 dt
+ E [∫ T
0
b
(
qit
)2
dt
]
+
(
αi − a
2
)
E
[(
Qq
i
T
)2]
+ E
[∫ T
0
λiσ
2
t
(
Qq
i
t
)2
dt
]
.
In the following, we will denote βi = αi − a2 . Fixing 0 ≤ t ≤ T , let
Qq¯
i
t,s := Q
qi
t +
∫ s
t
q¯iudu, for t ≤ s ≤ T,
and Cit,T (Q
qi
t , q¯
i, q−i) be the total cost on [t, T ] if, at time t, agent i starts using the strategy q¯i with the inventory
Qq
i
t , i.e.,
Cit,T (Q
qi
t , q¯
i, q−i) =
a
2
(
Qq
i
t
)2
−
∫ T
t
Qq¯
i
t,u
µu + a∑
j 6=i
qju
 du+ ∫ T
t
λiσ
2
u
(
Qq¯
i
t,u
)2
du
+
∫ T
t
b
(
q¯iu
)2
du−
∫ T
t
Qq¯
i
t,uσudWu + βi
(
Qq¯
i
t,T
)2
.
Let
Φit
(
Qq
i
t
)
: = ess inf
q¯i∈H2(R)
E
[
Cit,T
(
Qq
i
t , q¯
i, q−i
) ∣∣∣Ft]
=
a
2
(
Qq
i
t
)2
+ ess inf
q¯i∈H2(R)
E
∫ T
t
−Qq¯it,u
µu + a∑
j 6=i
qju − λiσ2uQq¯
i
t,u
+ b (q¯iu)2
 du+ βi (Qq¯it,T)2
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
 .
Our next goal is to obtain a representation of
Φˆit
(
Qq
i
t
)
:= Φit
(
Qq
i
t
)
− a
2
(
Qq
i
t
)2
.
in terms of component (Ai, Bi, Ci) of a solution of a three-dimensional BSDE, which will be discussed in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that βi ≥ 0 and qj ∈ H2(R), j 6= i, then the following BSDE A
i
t = βi −
∫ T
t
(
1
b
(
Ais
)2 − λiσ2s) ds− ∫ Tt ZAis dWs,
Bit = 0−
∫ T
t
(
1
bA
i
sB
i
s + µs + a
∑
j 6=i q
j
s
)
ds− ∫ T
t
ZB
i
s dWs
admits a unique solution (Ai, Bi, ZA
i
, ZB
i
) ∈ S∞(R)×S2(R)×BMO(Rd)×H2(Rd). Moreover, the solution of the
BSDE
dCit =
1
4b
(
Bit
)2
dt+ ZC
i
t dWt, C
i
T = 0,
is well defined and given by
Cit = 0−
∫ T
t
1
4b
(
Bis
)2
ds−
∫ T
t
ZC
i
s dWs.
Proof. Denoting M = βi + λi‖σ‖2∞T , it follows from Pardoux and Peng [15] that BSDE
Ait = βi −
∫ T
t
(
1
b
(
(−M) ∨Ais ∧M
)2 − λiσ2s) ds− ∫ T
t
ZA
i
s dWs
4
admits a unique solution (Ai, ZA
i
) ∈ S2(R)×H2(Rd). Moreover, we have the following estimate for Ai,
Ait ≤ E
[
βi −
∫ T
t
(
1
b
(
(−M) ∨Ais ∧M
)2 − λiσ2s) du|Ft
]
≤ βi + λi‖σ‖2∞(T − t).
Meanwhile by denoting ξt =
(−M)∨Ait∧M
b , it holds that
e−
∫ t
0
ξsdsAit = e
− ∫ T
0
ξsdsβi +
∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0
ξudu
(
λiσ
2
s + ξsA
i − bξ2s
)
ds−
∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0
ξuduZA
i
s dWs
≥ e−
∫ T
0
ξsdsβi −
∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0
ξuduZA
i
s dWs.
Therefore, we have
Ait ≥ E
[
e−
∫ T
t
ξsdsβi
∣∣∣Ft] ≥ βie−M(T−t)b .
Hence, (Ai, ZA
i
) ∈ S∞(R)×H2(Rd) and satisfies
Ait = βi −
∫ T
t
(
1
b
(
Ais
)2 − λiσ2s) ds− ∫ T
t
ZA
i
s dWs.
It is easy to check that ZA
i ∈ BMO(Rd). On the other hand, if
Ait = βi −
∫ T
t
(
1
b
(
Ais
)2 − λiσ2s) du− ∫ T
t
ZA
i
s dWs
admits a solution (Ai, ZA
i
) ∈ S∞(R)× BMO(Rd), we have
Ait ≤ E
[
βi −
∫ T
t
(
1
b
(
Ais
)2 − λiσ2s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ βi + λi‖σ‖2∞(T − t)
and
e−
∫ t
0
Ais
b dsAit = e
− ∫ T
0
Ais
b ds (βi) +
∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0
Aiu
b duλiσ
2
sds−
∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0
Aiu
b duZA
i
s dWs
≥ e−
∫ T
0
Ais
b ds (βi)−
∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0
Aiu
b duZA
i
s dWs.
Therefore, we have
Ait ≥ E
[
e−
∫ T
t
Ais
b dsβi|Ft
]
≥ βie−
M(T−t)
b .
Hence, (Ai, ZA
i
) satisfies
Ait = βi −
∫ T
t
(
1
b
(
(−M) ∨Ais ∧M
)2 − λiσ2s) ds− ∫ T
t
ZA
i
s dWs.
Again, it follows from Pardoux and Peng [15] that
Bit = 0−
∫ T
t
1
b
AisB
i
s + µs + a
∑
j 6=i
qjs
 du− ∫ T
t
ZB
i
s dWs
admits a unique solution (Bi, ZB
i
) ∈ S2(R)×H2(Rd). The rest is clear. 
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Theorem 3.1 Suppose that βi ≥ 0 and qj ∈ H2(R), j 6= i, then Φˆit
(
Qq
i
t
)
is given by
Φˆit
(
Qq
i
t
)
= Ait
(
Qq
i
t
)2
+BitQ
qi
t + C
i
t
where Ai, Bi, Ci are given as in Proposition 3.1. The unique optimal strategy for the agent i is given in feedback
form by
qi∗t = −
1
b
(
AitQ
qi∗
t +
1
2
Bit
)
.
Proof. By denoting 
V q
i
t = A
i
t
(
Qq
i
t
)2
+BitQ
qi
t + C
i
t ,
gA
i
t =
1
b
(
Ait
)2 − λiσ2t ,
gB
i
t =
1
bA
i
tB
i
t + µt + a
∑
j 6=i q
j
t ,
gC
i
t =
1
4b
(
Bit
)2
,
and applying Itoˆ’s formula, we have
dV q
i
t =2A
i
tQ
qi
t q
i
tdt+
(
Qq
i
t
)2
dAit +B
i
tq
i
tdt+Q
qi
t dB
i
t + g
Ci
t dt+ Z
Ci
t dWt
=2AitQ
qi
t q
i
tdt+
(
Qq
i
t
)2
gA
i
t dt+
(
Qq
i
t
)2
ZA
i
t dWt + g
Ci
t dt+ Z
Ci
t dWt +B
i
tq
i
tdt+Q
qi
t g
Bi
t dt+Q
qi
t Z
Bi
t dWt
=
(
2AitQ
qi
t q
i
t +
(
Qq
i
t
)2
gA
i
t +B
i
tq
i
t +Q
qi
t g
Bi
t + g
Ci
t
)
dt+
((
Qq
i
t
)2
ZA
i
t +Q
qi
t Z
Bi
t + Z
Ci
t
)
dWt.
Therefore it holds
dV q
i
t +
−Qqit
µt + a∑
j 6=i
qjt − λiσ2tQq
i
t
+ b (qit)2
 dt
=
2AitQqit qit + (Qqit )2 gAit +Bitqit +Qqit gBit + gCit −Qqit
µt + a∑
j 6=i
qjt − λiσ2tQq
i
t
+ b (qit)2
 dt
+
((
Qq
i
t
)2
ZA
i
t +Q
qi
t Z
Bi
t + Z
Ci
t
)
dWt.
and rearranging the drift terms, one can see
dV q
i
t +
−Qqit
µt + a∑
j 6=i
qjt − λiσ2tQq
i
t
+ b (qit)2
 dt
=
(
2AitQ
qi
t q
i
t +
1
b
(
Qq
i
t
)2 (
Ait
)2
+Bitq
i
t +
1
b
Qq
i
t A
i
tB
i
t +
1
4b
(
Bit
)2
+ b
(
qit
)2)
dt
+
((
Qq
i
t
)2
ZA
i
t +Q
qi
t Z
Bi
t + Z
Ci
t
)
dWt
=
1
b
(
AitQ
qi
t + bq
i
t +
1
2
Bit
)2
dt+
((
Qq
i
t
)2
ZA
i
t +Q
qi
t Z
Bi
t + Z
Ci
t
)
dWt.
Hence, it holds that
V q
i
t = V
qi
T +
∫ T
t
−Qqis
µs + a∑
j 6=i
qjs − λiσ2tQq
i
s
+ b (qis)2
 ds
−
∫ T
t
1
b
(
AisQ
qi
s + bq
i
s +
1
2
Bis
)2
ds−
∫ T
t
((
Qq
i
s
)2
ZA
i
s +Q
qi
s Z
Bi
s + Z
Ci
s
)
dWs.
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Therefore, for any qi, q¯i ∈ H2(R) and t ∈ [0, T ], by taking q˜is = qis1{s≤t} + q¯is1{s>t} for all s ∈ [0, T ], we have
V q
i
t = V
q˜i
t = βiQ
q¯i
t,T +
∫ T
t
−Qq¯it,s
µs + a∑
j 6=i
qjs − λiσ2tQq¯
i
t,s
+ b (q¯is)2
 ds
−
∫ T
t
1
b
(
AisQ
q¯i
t,s + bq¯
i
s +
1
2
Bis
)2
ds−
∫ T
t
((
Qq¯
i
t,s
)2
ZA
i
s +Q
q¯i
t,sZ
Bi
s + Z
Ci
s
)
dWs
which implies that
V q
i
t ≤ E
βiQq¯it,T + ∫ T
t
−Qq¯it,s
µs + a∑
j 6=i
qjs − λiσ2tQq¯
i
t,s
+ b (q¯is)2
 ds∣∣∣∣∣Ft
 .
Hence, it holds that
V q
i
t ≤ ess inf
q¯i∈H2(R)
E
βiQq¯it,T + ∫ T
t
−Qq¯it,s
µs + a∑
j 6=i
qjs − λiσ2tQq¯
i
t,s
+ b (q¯is)2
 ds∣∣∣∣∣Ft

= Φˆit
(
Qq
i
t
)
.
On the other hand, for any t ∈ [0, T ] and qi ∈ H2(R), the following random ODE
Qi∗s = Q
qi
t −
1
b
∫ s
t
(
AiuQ
i∗
u +
1
2
Biu
)
du, s ∈ [t, T ]
admits a unique solution Qi∗ ∈ S2(R) on [t, T ]. Therefore, by taking q˜is = qis1{s≤t} + qi∗s 1{s>t} with
qi∗s = −
1
b
(
AisQ
i∗
s +
1
2
Bis
)
,
we have
V q
i
t = V
q˜i
t = βiQ
qi∗
t,T +
∫ T
t
−Qqi∗t,s
µs + a∑
j 6=i
qjs − λiσ2tQq
i∗
t,s
+ b (qi∗s )2
 ds
−
∫ T
t
1
b
(
AisQ
qi∗
t,s + bq
i∗
s +
1
2
Bis
)2
ds−
∫ T
t
((
Qq
i∗
t,s
)2
ZA
i
s +Q
qi∗
t,s Z
Bi
s + Z
Ci
s
)
dWs
which implies that
V q
i
t = E
βiQqi∗t,T + ∫ T
t
−Qqi∗t,s
µs + a∑
j 6=i
qjs − λiσ2tQq
i∗
t,s
+ b (qi∗s )2
 ds∣∣∣∣∣Ft

≥ Φˆit
(
Qq
i
t
)
.
Therefore, it holds that
Φˆit
(
Qq
i
t
)
= Ait
(
Qq
i
t
)2
+BitQ
qi
t + C
i
t .
It is easy to verify that the unique optimal strategy (feedback form) for the agent i is given by
qi∗t = −
1
b
(
AitQ
qi∗
t +
1
2
Bit
)
.

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3.1 Characterization of the optimal strategy in terms of an FBSDE
In this section, we show that the optimal strategy for agent i can be given by the unique solution of an FBSDE.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose that βi ≥ 0 and qj ∈ H2(R), j 6= i, then
(
Qq
i∗
, qi∗, Q
qi∗ZA
i
b +
ZB
i
2b
)
is the unique solution
of the following FBSDE Q
qi
t = Q
i
0 +
∫ t
0
qisds,
qit = −βib Qq
i
T +
∫ T
t
1
b
(
−λiσ2sQq
i
s +
(µs+a
∑
j 6=i q
j
s)
2
)
ds+
∫ T
t
ZisdWs.
(3.1)
in S2(R)× S2(R)×H2(Rd).
Proof. By denoting
Λit := e
− ∫ t
0
1
bA
i
sds,
it is easy to deduce that:
d
(
ΛitQ
qi∗
t A
i
t
)
= ΛitQ
qi∗
t dA
i
t + Λ
i
tq
i∗
t A
i
tdt+Q
qi∗
t A
i
tdΛ
i
t
= Λitq
i∗
t A
i
tdt+
ΛitQ
qi∗
t
(
Ait
)2
b
dt− λiσ2tΛitQq
i∗
t dt−
ΛitQ
qi∗
t
(
Ait
)2
b
dt+ ΛitQ
qi∗
t Z
Ai
t dWt
= Λitq
i∗
t A
i
tdt− λiσ2tΛitQq
i∗
t dt+ Λ
i
tQ
qi∗
t Z
Ai
t dWt.
Therefore, it holds that
ΛitQ
qi∗
t A
i
t = βiΛ
i
TQ
qi∗
T −
∫ T
t
Λisq
i∗
s A
i
sds+
∫ T
t
λiσ
2
sΛ
i
sQ
qi∗
s ds−
∫ T
t
ΛisQ
qi∗
s Z
Ai
s dWs.
Noting that
ΛitB
i
t = −
∫ T
t
Λis
µs + a∑
j 6=i
qjs
 ds− ∫ T
t
ΛisZ
Bi
s dWs,
one has
Λitq
i∗
t = −
βi
b
ΛiTQ
qi∗
T +
∫ T
t
1
b
Λisqi∗s Ais − λiσ2sΛisQqi∗s + Λis
(
µs + a
∑
j 6=i q
j
s
)
2
 ds
+
∫ T
t
(
ΛisQ
qi∗
s Z
Ai
s
b
+
ΛisZ
Bi
s
2b
)
dWs.
Therefore, it holds that
dqi∗t = d
((
Λit
)−1
Λitq
i∗
t
)
=
Ait
b
qi∗t dt−
(
Λit
)−11
b
Λitqi∗t Ait − λiσ2tΛitQqi∗t + Λit
(
µt + a
∑
j 6=i q
j
t
)
2
 dt
+
(
ΛitQ
qi∗
t Z
Ai
t
b
+
ΛitZ
Bi
t
2b
)
dWt
)
=
1
b
λiσ2tQqi∗t −
(
µt + a
∑
j 6=i q
j
t
)
2
 dt−(Qqi∗t ZAit
b
+
ZB
i
t
2b
)
dWt.
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It is easy to check that
(
Qq
i∗
, qi∗, Q
qi∗ZA
i
b +
ZB
i
2b
)
is in S2(R) × S2(R) ×H2(Rd). We now prove the uniqueness.
Suppose that FBSDE (3.1) admits another solution (Qq¯
i
, q¯i, Z¯i) ∈ S2(R)× S2(R)×H2(Rd). Then, we have Q
qi
t −Qq¯
i
t =
∫ t
0
(
qis − q¯is
)
ds,
qit − q¯it = −βib
(
Qq
i
T −Qq¯
i
T
)
+
∫ T
t
1
b
(
−λiσ2s
(
Qq
i
s −Qq¯
i
s
))
ds+
∫ T
t
(
Zis − Z¯is
)
dWs.
Therefore, it holds that
(
qit − q¯it
) (
Qq
i
t −Qq¯
i
t
)
= −βi
b
(
Qq
i
T −Qq¯
i
T
)2
+
∫ T
t
1
b
(
−λiσ2s
(
Qq
i
s −Qq¯
i
s
)2)
ds
−
∫ T
t
(
qis − q¯is
)2
ds+
∫ T
t
(
Qq
i
t −Qq¯
i
t
) (
Zis − Z¯is
)
dWs.
Thus, it holds that
0 = E
[
−βi
b
(
Qq
i
T −Qq¯
i
T
)2
−
∫ T
0
λiσ
2
s
b
(
Qq
i
s −Qq¯
i
s
)2
ds−
∫ T
0
(
qis − q¯is
)2
ds
]
≤ 0
which implies uniqueness. 
4 Characterization and existence of a Nash equilibrium
We first provide a characterizing result of a Nash equilibrium in terms of a system of FBSDE.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that βi ≥ 0, if the following FBSDE: Q
qi
t = Q
i
0 +
∫ t
0
qisds, i = 1, . . . , n
qit = −βib Qq
i
T +
∫ T
t
1
b
(
−λiσ2sQq
i
s +
(µs+a
∑
j 6=i q
j
s)
2
)
ds+
∫ T
t
ZisdWs, i = 1, . . . , n.
(4.1)
admits a solution (Qq, q, Z) ∈ S2(Rn) × S2(Rn) ×H2(Rn×d), then q is a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, if
q ∈ H2(Rn) is a Nash equilibrium, then (Qq, q, Z) is a solution of FBSDE 4.1 in S2(Rn) × S2(Rn) × H2(Rn×d),
where Z is given by
Z =
(
Qq
1
ZA
1
b
+
ZB
1
2b
, . . . ,
Qq
n
ZA
n
b
+
ZB
n
2b
)′
,
where for i = 1, . . . , n, ZA
i
, ZB
i
are given as in Theorem 3.1 and M
′
denotes the transpose of the matrix M .
Proof. The result follows directly from Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2. 
In order to get a Nash equilibrium, it is sufficient to have the existence of solution for FBSDE (4.1). In this section,
we will investigate the solvability for FBSDE (4.1). An existence and uniqueness result for small time horizon is
due to Antonelli [5]. Under some assumptions, we get a unique global solution for FBSDE (4.1) which is stated in
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose that βi > 0, λi > 0 and λiσ
2
t >
1
16a
2b(n−1) for all i = 1, . . . , n and t ∈ [0, T ], then FBSDE
(4.1) admits a unique solution (Qq, q, Z) ∈ S2(Rn)× S2(Rn)×H2(Rn×d).
Proof. Denoting q˜it = −qit, we have Q
qi
t = Q
i
0 −
∫ t
0
q˜isds, i = 1, . . . , n
q˜it =
βi
b Q
qi
T −
∫ T
t
1
b
(
−λiσ2sQq
i
s +
µs
2 −
a
∑
j 6=i q˜
j
s
2
)
ds− ∫ T
t
ZisdWs, i = 1, . . . , n.
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Since it holds that
n∑
i=1
βi
b
|xi|2 ≥ min
1≤i≤n
βi
b
|x|2
and
n∑
i=1
−λiσ2t
b
|xi|2 − |yi|2 − a
2
∑
j 6=i
yjxi
 ≤ n∑
i=1
−λiσ2t
b
|xi|2 − |yi|2 + a
2(n− 1)
16
|xi|2 +
∑
j 6=i
1
n− 1 |yj |
2

=
n∑
i=1
(
−λiσ
2
t
b
+
a2(n− 1)
16
)
|xi|2
≤ − min
1≤i≤n
inf
0≤t≤T
(
λiσ
2
t
b
− a
2(n− 1)
16
)
|x|2,
the monotonicity condition in Peng-Wu [16] is satisfied. Therefore, the solvability follows. 
As a direct consequence of Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2, we have the following corollary on the existence and
uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 4.1 Suppose that βi > 0, λi > 0 and λiσ
2
t >
1
16a
2b(n− 1) for all i = 1, . . . , n and t ∈ [0, T ], then there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
4.1 A Riccati-type equation
Since FBSDE (4.1) is linear, we will investigate it’s solvability through Riccati equations. Indeed, FBSDE (4.1)
could be rewritten as{
Qqt = Q0 +
∫ t
0
qsds,
q(t) = GQqT +
∫ T
t
(
AˆsQ
q
s + (− a2bIn + a2b Bˆ)qs + Cˆs
)
ds+
∫ T
t
ZsdWs
where G is n× n diagonal matrix with diagonal elements −βib , Aˆs is n× n diagonal matrix with diagonal elements
−λiσ2sb , In is n× n identity matrix, Bˆ is n× n matrix whose elements are all equal to 1 and Cˆs =
(
µs
2b , . . . ,
µs
2b
)T
.
Suppose that the following holds:
qt = PtQ
q
t + pt, t ∈ [0, T ],
with (P,Λ) and (p, η) being the adapted solutions of the following BSDEs respectively:{
dPt = Γtdt+ ΛtdWt,
PT = G
and {
dpt = ξtdt+ ηtdWt,
pT = 0
where Γ and ξ will be chosen later. Applying Itoˆ’s formula, we have the following
(ΓtQ
q
t + Ptqt + ξt) dt+ (ΛtQ
q
t + ηt) dWt
= dqt = −
(
AˆtQ
q
t +
(
− a
2b
In +
a
2b
Bˆ
)
qt + Cˆt
)
dt− ZtdWt.
Comparing drift and diffusion terms, we should have{ (
Γt + P
2
t
)
Qqt + Ptpt + ξt = −
(
Aˆt +
(
− a2bIn + a2b Bˆ
)
Pt
)
Qqt −
((
− a2bIn + a2b Bˆ
)
pt + Cˆt
)
,
ΛtQ
q
t + ηt = −Zt.
Therefore, we will take  Γ = −Aˆt −
(
− a2bIn + a2b Bˆ
)
Pt − P 2t
ξt = −
(
− a2bIn + a2b Bˆ + Pt
)
pt − Cˆt
Thus, we obtain the following result.
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Proposition 4.1 Suppose that the following BSDE{
dPt =
(
−Aˆt −
(
− a2bIn + a2b Bˆ
)
Pt − P 2t
)
dt+ ΛtdWt,
PT = G
(4.2)
admits an adapted solution (P,Λ) ∈ Sm(Rn×n)×Hm(Rn×n×d) for all m ≥ 1. Suppose moreover that the following
BSDE {
dpt =
(
−
(
− a2bIn + a2b Bˆ + Pt
)
pt − Cˆt
)
dt+ ηtdWt,
pT = 0
(4.3)
admits a unique adapted solution (p, η) ∈ Sm(Rn) × Hm(Rn×d) for all m ≥ 1 and that the unique solution of
following random ODE,
Qqt = Q0 +
∫ t
0
(PsQ
q
s + ps) ds (4.4)
belongs to Sm(Rn) for all m ≥ 1. Then FBSDE (4.1) admits an adapted solution (Qq, q, Z) ∈ S2(Rn)× S2(Rn)×
H2(Rn×d) such that qt = PtQqt + pt and Zt = −ΛtQqt − ηt.
4.2 When σt = σ and µt = µ
In the current case, the FBSDE (4.1) takes the following form:{
Qqt = Q0 +
∫ t
0
qsds,
qt = GQ
q
T +
∫ T
t
(
AˆQqs + (− a2bIn + a2b Bˆ)qs + Cˆ
)
ds
where G is n× n diagonal matrix with diagonal elements −βib , Aˆ is n× n diagonal matrix with diagonal elements
−λiσ2b , In is n× n identity matrix, Bˆ is n× n matrix whose elements are all equal to 1 and Cˆ =
(
µ
2b , . . . ,
µ
2b
)T
. By
denoting A˜ = a2b
(
In − Bˆ
)
, we obtain the following equivalent second order inhomogeneous ODE
Q′′ = A˜Q′ − AˆQ− Cˆ equivalent to Λ′ = MΛ +N
where
Λ =
[
Q′
Q
]
M =
[
A˜ −Aˆ
In 0
]
N =
[−Cˆ
0
]
Since M is invertible, the solution is given by
Λ = exp (tM)
[
ξ1
ξ2
]
+
∫ t
0
exp (sM)Nds = exp (tM)
[
ξ1
ξ2
]
+ (exp (tM)− I2n)M−1N
where ξ1, ξ2 in R2n is a vector to be determined by the conditions:
Λ[n+ 1, 2n](0) = Q(0) = Q0, and Λ[1, n](T ) = GQ(T )
It follows that ξ2 = Q0. Hence the second condition is given by
exp (TM)
[
ξ1
Q0
]
+ (exp (TM)− I2n)M−1N
=
[
0 G
0 In
] [
exp (TM)
[
ξ1
Q0
]
+ (exp (TM)− I2n)M−1N
]
equivalent to [
In −G
]
exp (TM)
[
ξ1
Q0
]
=
[−In G] (exp (TM)− I2n)M−1N
Hence, denoting by
exp (TM) =
[
E1 E2
E3 E4
]
it follows that ξ1 is given by
ξ1 = (E1 −GE3)−1
[[−In G] (exp (TM)− I2n)M−1N − (E2 −GE4)Q0] .
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4.2.1 Numerical results
Throughout we consider the following set of parameters
• Market parameters
– drift: µ = 2%
– vol: σ = 20%
– Maturity: T = 1
– price impact: a = 1%
– slippage: b = 1%
• 3 traders:
– Risk aversion: α = (1, 0.5, 0.25), λ = (1, 0.5, 0.25),
– Position to liquidate: Q = (1, 1, 0.5)
• Dependence on the drift
Figure 1: Plot of the three agents’inventory for different drift values
As the drift increases, the agents tend to liquidate slowly or even start buying at the beginning to benefit
from the future mean return which will compensate to the liquidation cost.
• Dependence on the volatility
Figure 2: Plot of the three agents’inventory for different volatility values
As the volatility increases, the agents tend to liquidate quickly at the beginning to reduce the liquidation risk.
• Dependence on a
12
Figure 3: Plot of the three agents’inventory for different values of price impact
As the permanent market impact increases, the agents tend to liquidate quickly at the beginning to reduce
the liquidation cost. For high permanent market impact, the agent with smaller initial inventory tend to short
sell and reliquidate to make profit which will compensate to the liquidation cost.
• Dependence on b
Figure 4: Plot of the three agents’inventory for different values of slippage effect
For small slippage, the agent with smaller initial inventory tend to vary between liquidation and purchasing
to make profit which will compensate to the liquidation cost.
• Dependence on α joint magnitude
Figure 5: Plot of the three agents’inventory for different values of risk aversion on terminal value
• Dependence on α different for the first agent
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Figure 6: Plot of the three agents’inventory for different values of risk aversion on terminal value
• Dependence on λ joint magnitude
Figure 7: Plot of the three agents’inventory for different values of risk aversion on continuous trading
• Dependence on λ first agent
Figure 8: Plot of the three agents’inventory for different values of risk aversion on continuous trading for one agent
• Dependence on Q first agent
Figure 9: Plot of the three agents’inventory for different start value of fist agent’s inventory.
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• Dependence on Q first agent with two arbitrageurs
Figure 10: Plot of the three agents’inventory for different start value of fist agent’s inventory with two arbitrageurs.
When the initial position of the first agent is small, arbitrageurs tend to first buy and then liquidate to benefit
from the future mean return. When the initial position of the first agent is high, arbitrageurs tend to first
short sell and then buy to make profit from the price differences. Moreover, The arbitrageurs will not use
very aggressive strategies.
4.3 Case for similar agents
Theorem 4.3 Suppose that β1 = . . . = βn = β ≥ 0 and λ1 = . . . = λn = λ ≥ 0. Then{
Q˜t =
∑n
i=1Q
i
0 +
∫ t
0
q˜sds,
q˜t = −βb Q˜T +
∫ T
t
1
b
(
−λσ2sQ˜s + nµs2 + (n−1)aq˜s2
)
ds+
∫ T
t
Z˜sdWs
(4.5)
admits a unique solution (Q˜, q˜, Z˜) ∈ S2(R)× S2(R)×H2(Rd) and Q
qi
t = Q
i
0 +
∫ t
0
qisds, i = 1, . . . , n
qit = −βbQq
i
T +
∫ T
t
1
b
(
−λσ2sQq
i
s +
µs
2 − aq
i
t
2 +
aq˜s
2
)
ds+
∫ T
t
ZisdWs, i = 1, . . . , n
(4.6)
admits a unique solution (Qq, q, Z) ∈ S2(Rn)× S2(Rn)×H2(Rn×d). In addition, it holds that
Q˜ =
∑n
i=1Q
qi ,
q˜ =
∑n
i=1 q
i,
Z˜ =
∑n
i=1 Z
i.
Moreover, (Qq, q, Z) is the unique solution of FBSDE (4.1).
Proof. We will divide the proof into several steps.
Step 1: Denoting M = e
(n−1)aT
2b
β
b + e
(n−1)aT
2b
λ‖σ‖2∞
2b T , it follows from Pardoux and Peng [15] that BSDE
Pt = −β
b
+
∫ T
t
(
−λσ
2
s
b
+
(n− 1)a
2b
Ps + ((−M) ∨ Ps ∧M)2
)
ds−
∫ T
t
ΛsdWs
admits a unique solution (P,Λ) ∈ S2(R)×H2(Rd). Moreover, we have the following a priori estimate for P . Since
e
(n−1)at
2b Pt = −e
(n−1)aT
2b
β
b
+
∫ T
t
(
−e (n−1)as2b λσ
2
s
2b
+ e
(n−1)as
2b ((−M) ∨ Ps ∧M)2
)
ds−
∫ T
t
e
(n−1)as
2b ΛsdWs
it holds that
e
(n−1)at
2b Pt ≥ E
[
−e (n−1)aT2b β
b
+
∫ T
t
(
−e (n−1)as2b λσ
2
s
2b
)
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
≥ −e (n−1)aT2b β
b
− e (n−1)aT2b λ‖σ‖
2
∞
2b
(T − t)
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Hence
Pt ≥ −e
(n−1)aT
2b
β
b
− e (n−1)aT2b λ‖σ‖
2
∞
2b
T
Meanwhile by denoting ξt = (−M) ∨ Pt ∧M , it holds that
e
∫ t
0 (ξs+
(n−1)a
2b )dsPt = −e
∫ T
0 (ξs+
(n−1)a
2b )ds β
b
+
∫ T
t
e
∫ s
0 (ξu+
(n−1)a
2b )du
(
−λσ
2
s
b
− ξsPs + ξ2s
)
ds
−
∫ T
t
e
∫ s
0 (ξu+
(n−1)a
2b )duΛsdWs
≤ −e
∫ T
0 (ξs+
(n−1)a
2b )ds β
b
−
∫ T
t
e
∫ s
0 (ξu+
(n−1)a
2b )duΛsdWs.
Therefore, we have
Pt ≤ E
[
−e
∫ T
t (ξs+
(n−1)a
2b )ds β
b
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ −β
b
e−M(T−t).
Hence, (P,Λ) ∈ S∞(R)×H2(Rd) and satisfies
Pt = −β
b
+
∫ T
t
(
−λσ
2
s
b
+
(n− 1)a
2b
Ps + P
2
s
)
ds−
∫ T
t
ΛsdWs
On the other hand, if
Pt = −β
b
+
∫ T
t
(
−λσ
2
s
b
+
(n− 1)a
2b
Ps + P
2
s
)
ds−
∫ T
t
ΛsdWs
admits a solution (P,Λ) ∈ S∞(R)×H2(Rd), we have
e
(n−1)at
2b Pt = −e
(n−1)aT
2b
β
b
+
∫ T
t
(
−e (n−1)as2b λσ
2
s
2b
+ e
(n−1)as
2b P 2s
)
ds−
∫ T
t
e
(n−1)as
2b ΛsdWs
and
e
∫ t
0 (
(n−1)a
2b +Ps)dsPt = −e
∫ T
0 (
(n−1)a
2b +Ps)ds β
2b
+
∫ T
t
(
−e
∫ s
0 (
(n−1)a
2b +Pu)duλσ
2
s
2b
)
ds−
∫ T
t
e
∫ s
0 (
(n−1)a
2b +Pu)duΛsdWs
Therefore, we have
Pt ≥ E
[
−e (n−1)a(T−t)2b β
b
+
∫ T
t
(
−e (n−1)a(s−t)2b λσ
2
s
2b
)
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
≥ −e (n−1)aT2b β
b
− e (n−1)aT2b λ‖σ‖
2
∞
2b
T
and
Pt ≤ E
[
−e
∫ T
t (Ps+
(n−1)a
2b )ds β
b
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ −β
b
e−M(T−t).
Hence, (P,Λ) satisfies
Pt = −β
b
+
∫ T
t
(
−λσ
2
s
b
+
(n− 1)a
2b
Ps + ((−M) ∨ Ps ∧M)2
)
ds−
∫ T
t
ΛsdWs
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Again, it follows from Pardoux and Peng [15] that
pt =
∫ T
t
((
(n− 1)a
2b
+ Ps
)
ps +
nµs
2b
)
ds−
∫ T
t
ηsdWs
admits a unique solution (p, η) ∈ S2(R)×H2(Rd). Moreover, one could easily check that p ∈ S∞(R), η ∈ BMO(Rd)
and Λ ∈ BMO(Rd). Hence, from standard theory of SDEs, SDE (4.4) admits a unique strong solution Q˜ ∈ S∞(R).
Therefore, according to Proposition 4.1, FBSDE (4.5) admits a solution (Q˜, q˜, Z˜) ∈ S2(R)× S2(R)×H2(Rd).
We now prove the uniqueness. Suppose that FBSDE (4.5) admits another solution (Q¯, q¯, Z¯) ∈ S2(R)×S2(R)×
H2(Rd). Then, we have{
Q˜t − Q¯t =
∫ t
0
(q˜s − q¯s) ds,
q˜t − q¯t = −βb
(
Q˜T − Q¯T
)
+
∫ T
t
1
b
(
−λσ2s
(
Q˜s − Q¯s
)
+ (n−1)a2 (q˜s − q¯s)
)
ds+
∫ T
t
(
Z˜s − Z¯s
)
dWs
Therefore, it holds that
(q˜t − q¯t)
(
Q˜t − Q¯t
)
= −β
b
(
Q˜T − Q¯T
)2
+
∫ T
t
1
b
(
−λσ2s
(
Q˜s − Q¯s
)2
+
(n− 1)a
2
(q˜s − q¯s)
(
Q˜t − Q¯t
))
ds
−
∫ T
t
(q˜s − q¯s)2 ds+
∫ T
t
(
Q˜t − Q¯t
)(
Z˜s − Z¯s
)
dWs
Hence, we have
e
(n−1)at
2 (q˜t − q¯t)
(
Q˜t − Q¯t
)
= −β
b
e
(n−1)aT
2
(
Q˜T − Q¯T
)2
−
∫ T
t
λσ2s
b
e
(n−1)as
2
(
Q˜s − Q¯s
)2
ds
−
∫ T
t
e
(n−1)as
2 (q˜s − q¯s)2 ds+
∫ T
t
e
(n−1)as
2
(
Q˜t − Q¯t
)(
Z˜s − Z¯s
)
dWs
Thus, it holds that
0 = E
[
−β
b
e
(n−1)aT
2
(
Q˜T − Q¯T
)2
−
∫ T
0
λσ2s
b
e
(n−1)as
2
(
Q˜s − Q¯s
)2
ds−
∫ T
0
e
(n−1)as
2 (q˜s − q¯s)2 ds
]
≤ 0
which implies uniqueness.
Step 2: Noting that q˜ ∈ S∞(R), following from a similar technique as in Step 1, FBSDE (4.6) admits a unique
solution (Qq, q, Z) ∈ S2(Rn)× S2(Rn)×H2(Rn×d). Moreover, it holds that
∑n
i=1Q
qi
t =
∑n
i=1Q
i
0 +
∫ t
0
∑n
i=1 q
i
sds,∑n
i=1 q
i
t = −βb
∑n
i=1Q
qi
T +
∫ T
t
1
b
(
−λσ2s
∑n
i=1Q
qi
s +
nµs
2 −
∑n
i=1
aqit
2 +
anq˜s
2
)
ds+
∫ T
t
∑n
i=1 Z
i
sdWs
Therefore, we have
∑n
i=1Q
qi
t − Q˜t =
∫ t
0
(∑n
i=1 q
i
s − q˜s
)
ds,∑n
i=1 q
i
t − q˜s = −βb
(∑n
i=1Q
qi
T − Q˜T
)
+
∫ T
t
1
b
(
−λσ2s
(∑n
i=1Q
qi
s − Q˜s
)
− a2
(∑n
i=1 q
i
s − q˜s
))
ds
+
∫ T
t
(∑n
i=1 Z
i
s − Z˜s
)
dWs
It follows from the uniqueness part of Step 1 that
Q˜ =
∑n
i=1Q
qi ,
q˜ =
∑n
i=1 q
i,
Z˜ =
∑n
i=1 Z
i.
Step 3: The last statement follows immediately from the uniqueness of solutions of FBSDEs (4.5) and (4.6). 
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4.3.1 Asymptotic property
If we scale the permanent market impact by the number of agents n or equivalently the permanent market impact
is generated by the average of liquidation strategy of all agents, the FBSDE characterizing the Nash equilibrium
turns to be the following FBSDE Q
qi,n
t = Q
i
0 +
∫ t
0
qi,ns ds, i = 1, . . . , n
qi,nt = −αi−
a
2n
b Q
qi,n
T +
∫ T
t
1
b
(
−λiσ2sQq
i,n
s +
(µs+ an
∑
j 6=i q
j,n
s )
2
)
ds+
∫ T
t
Zi,ns dWs, i = 1, . . . , n.
(4.7)
Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4 Suppose that αi = α > 0, λi = λ ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and limn→∞ 1n
∑n
i=1Q
i
0 = Q
∗
0 ∈ R. Then{
Q∗t = Q
∗
0 +
∫ t
0
q∗sds,
q∗t = −αbQ∗T +
∫ T
t
1
b
(
−λσ2sQ∗s + (µs+aq
∗
s )
2
)
ds+
∫ T
t
Z∗sdWs.
(4.8)
admits a unique solution (Q∗, q∗, Z∗) ∈ S2(R)× S2(R)×H2(Rd) and Q
q˜i
t = Q
i
0 +
∫ t
0
q˜isds
q˜it = −αbQq˜
i
T +
∫ T
t
1
b
(
−λσ2sQq˜
i
s +
(µs+aq
∗
s )
2
)
ds+
∫ T
t
Z˜isdWs
(4.9)
admits a unique solution (Qq˜
i
, q˜i, Z˜i) ∈ S2(R) × S2(R) × H2(Rd) for all i ∈ N. Let n be large enough such that
α ≥ a2n and (Qq
·,n
, q·,n, Z·,n) ∈ S2(Rn)×S2(Rn)×H2(Rn×d) be the unique solution of FBSDE (4.7). Then it holds
that
‖ 1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n −Q∗‖S2(R) + ‖ 1
n
n∑
i=1
qi,n − q∗‖S2(R) + ‖ 1
n
n∑
i=1
Zi,n − Z∗‖H2(Rd) → 0 as n→∞
and
‖Qqi,n −Qq˜i‖S2(R) + ‖qi,n − q˜i‖S2(R) + ‖Zi,n − Z˜i‖H2(Rd) → 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as n→∞
Proof. It follows from a similar technique as in Theorem 4.3, FBSDE (4.8) admits a unique solution (Q∗, q∗, Z∗) ∈
S2(R)×S2(R)×H2(Rd) and FBSDE (4.9) admits a unique solution (Qq˜i , q˜i, Z˜i) ∈ S2(R)×S2(R)×H2(Rd) for all
i ∈ N.
Let n be large enough such that α ≥ a2n , it follows from Theorem 4.3 that FBSDE (4.7) admits a unique solution
(Qq
·,n
, q·,n, Z·,n) ∈ S2(Rn)×S2(Rn)×H2(Rn×d). Moreover, one could check that there exists a constant M which
does not depend on n such that
‖Qqi,n‖S2(R) + ‖qi,n‖S2(R) + ‖Zi,n‖H2(Rd) ≤M, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In addition, we have
1
n
∑n
i=1Q
qi,n
t =
1
n
∑n
i=1Q
i
0 +
∫ t
0
1
n
∑n
i=1 q
i,n
s ds,
1
n
∑n
i=1 q
i,n
t = −α−
a
2n
b
1
n
∑n
i=1Q
qi,n
T +
∫ T
t
1
b
(
−λσ2s 1n
∑n
i=1Q
qi,n
s +
µs
2 +
a(n−1)
2n
1
n
∑n
i=1 q
i,n
s
)
ds
+
∫ T
t
1
n
∑n
i=1 Z
i,n
s dWs.
Therefore, it holds that
1
n
∑n
i=1Q
qi,n
t −Q∗t = 1n
∑n
i=1Q
i
0 −Q∗0 +
∫ t
0
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 q
i,n
s − q∗s
)
ds,
1
n
∑n
i=1 q
i,n
t − q∗t = −α−
a
2n
b
1
n
∑n
i=1Q
qi,n
T +
α
bQ
∗
T −
∫ T
t
λσ2s
b
(
1
n
∑n
i=1Q
qi,n
s −Q∗s
)
ds
+
∫ T
t
1
b
(
a
2
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 q
i,n
s − q∗s
)− a2n2 ∑ni=1 qi,ns ) ds+ ∫ Tt ( 1n∑ni=1 Zi,ns − Z∗s ) dWs.
Thus, we get(
1
n
n∑
i=1
qi,nt − q∗t
)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
t −Q∗t
)
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=(
−α−
a
2n
b
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
T +
α
b
Q∗T
)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
T −Q∗T
)
−
∫ T
t
λσ2s
b
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
s −Q∗s
)2
ds
+
∫ T
t
1
b
(
a
2
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
qi,ns − q∗s
)
− a
2n2
n∑
i=1
qi,ns
)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
s −Q∗s
)
ds
−
∫ T
t
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
qi,ns − q∗s
)2
ds+
∫ T
t
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
s −Q∗s
)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Zi,ns − Z∗s
)
dWs.
Therefore, we obtain
e
at
2b
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
qi,nt − q∗t
)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
t −Q∗t
)
= e
aT
2b
(
−α−
a
2n
b
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
T +
α
b
Q∗T
)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
T −Q∗T
)
−
∫ T
t
e
as
2b
λσ2s
b
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
s −Q∗s
)2
ds
−
∫ T
t
e
as
2b
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
qi,ns − q∗s
)2
ds−
∫ T
t
e
as
2b
a
2bn2
n∑
i=1
qi,ns
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
s −Q∗s
)
ds
+
∫ T
t
e
as
2b
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
s −Q∗s
)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Zi,ns − Z∗s
)
dWs.
Hence, it holds that
0 ≥ E
−e aT2b a
b
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
T −Q∗T
)2
−
∫ T
0
e
as
2b
λσ2s
b
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
s −Q∗s
)2
ds−
∫ T
t
e
as
2b
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
qi,ns − q∗s
)2
ds

= E
[(
1
n
n∑
i=1
qi,n0 − q∗0
)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
0 −Q∗0
)]
+ E
[
e
aT
2b
a
2bn2
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
T
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
T −Q∗T
)]
− E
[∫ T
0
e
as
2b
a
2bn2
n∑
i=1
qi,ns
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n
s −Q∗s
)
ds
]
which goes to 0 as n goes to infinity. Therefore, one could deduce that
‖ 1
n
n∑
i=1
Qq
i,n −Q∗‖S2(R) + ‖ 1
n
n∑
i=1
qi,n − q∗‖S2(R) + ‖ 1
n
n∑
i=1
Zi,n − Z∗‖H2(Rd) → 0 as n→ 0
Similarly, it holds that
‖Qqi,n −Qq˜i‖S2(R) + ‖qi,n − q˜i‖S2(R) + ‖Zi,n − Z˜i‖H2(Rd) → 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as n→ 0

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